Browsing should be fine. Editing is restricted via the TorBlock extension.. Seemingly mostly for for the reason of abuse/spam

https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Extension:TorBlock

Not high priority, considering that this topic has been discussed many times at wikitech-l.

Browsing seems to be ok when tested with the Tor Browser Bundle.

Editing obviously isn't:
You do not have permission to edit this page, for the following reason:

Your IP address, 194.132.32.42, has been automatically identified as a Tor exit node. Editing through Tor is blocked to prevent abuse. For additional information and instructions to legitimate users, see the No open proxies global policy.

(In reply to comment #4)

Browsing seems to be ok when tested with the Tor Browser Bundle.

Editing obviously isn't:
You do not have permission to edit this page, for the following reason:

Your IP address, 194.132.32.42, has been automatically identified as a Tor
exit
node. Editing through Tor is blocked to prevent abuse. For additional
information and instructions to legitimate users, see the No open proxies
global policy.

Yes, this is most like what he meant. This bugzilla is meant as a starting point and tracker to find a solution.

Could you explain why the current solution is inadequate? (Not trying to argue, just want a more specific idea of what the expected outcome of this bug is.)

(In reply to comment #6)

Could you explain why the current solution is inadequate? (Not trying to
argue,
just want a more specific idea of what the expected outcome of this bug is.)

See above: Jake complaint, that TOR users cannot edit Wikipedia, but he (more the less) demands, that this becomes possible in the framework of a safe internet (these are my words).

(In reply to comment #6)

Could you explain why the current solution is inadequate? (Not trying to
argue,
just want a more specific idea of what the expected outcome of this bug is.)

This is more of a policy issue, but I know one problem with the current system is the massive discretion with which it is given out. I mean, I applied for it a few months ago since I run a Tor exit node and am routinely blocked from editing, and I was denied. I have a history of positive contributions to enwiki and am also an active MW developer whose real life identity is known to the foundation. If I can't be trusted with editing from Tor then who can?

(In reply to comment #8)

This is more of a policy issue, but I know one problem with the current
system
is the massive discretion with which it is given out. I mean, I applied for
it
a few months ago since I run a Tor exit node and am routinely blocked from
editing, and I was denied. I have a history of positive contributions to
enwiki
and am also an active MW developer whose real life identity is known to the
foundation. If I can't be trusted with editing from Tor then who can?

The uniformed making decisions about things they don't know about?

This is a social and philosophical/policy issue, not really a technical issue, as the technical solutions are simple and obvious. The first is from the user end, which is to edit without using Tor (just as there are other technical restrictions on editing). The WMF cluster solution would be to take the TorBlock extension out of service.

TorBlock was developed because of the massive vandalism, spamming, and socially inappropriate behaviour coming from those nodes, requiring extensive cleanups, blocks, and a distraction from the actual content creation/curation purpose of the Wikimedia sites.

I have a hard time imagining any technical solutions that could not be abused. Without tying users to a physical IP address, it is virtually impossible to prevent sockpuppet abuse. This is why editing from Tor is limited to trusted users.

My suggestion would be to argue for policy changes at https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Main_Page and close this bug as WONTFIX.

Some background, the previous long discussion at wikitech-l started here:

http://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikitech-l/2012-December/065345.html

It was also advertized in the TOR development mailing list:

https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2012-December/004319.html

The discussion of this bugzilla continued in the mailing list discussion thread
--> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.linguistics.wikipedia.technical/74582

just as a reference the cases of sockpuppet abuse: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Sock_puppetry. having probably not enough experience here, i ask myself:

• if we still care about all of these points today, and what would happen if we would not care any more? i can read and understand all of these points, but have a hard time to imagine a real world damaging example in at least half of the cases.

• if additional dynamic flags / roles would help? e.g. a "vote" flag, which allows an account to vote. a default account (which can be created via tor as well) would not have one. such flags/roles could also be used to mark "software contributors" if some commit happened to a recognized project in the last X months. which then would finally give these people as well the deserved recognition especially from not so experienced members of our community.

comment from the mailing list

"a global policy now is in place to allow global exemptions via email requests.
https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/NOP "

So because nobody is willing to fix this, I think it is a typical WONTFIX. (I reported this issue, I set it now to WONTFIX, and feel unhappy for Jake)

(In reply to comment #16)

So because nobody is willing to fix this, I think it is a typical WONTFIX. (I
reported this issue, I set it now to WONTFIX, and feel unhappy for Jake)

Actually there are people willing to work toward a technical solution that consists neither of removing Torblock altogether nor of the status quo. See e.g. the comment in the current Wikitech-l thread by Chris Steipp (WMF security engineer with actual expertise in this area, who has worked on e.g. authentication, checkuser, other admin tools for combating abuse...): http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/wiki/wikitech/420122#420122
(As Chris mentions there, I am personally still unconvinced that these ideas by TOR's Tom Lowenthal will lead to a viable solution; I hope I will soon find the time to explain why. But at least it's an interesting, smart way to think about the issue.)

Therefore I reopened the bug, to avoid giving a wrong impression of the current consensus.

The discussion in http://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikitech-l/2013-December/073764.html and followups feels like there should be community consensus first and fixing technical difficulties, so I am setting lowest priority here simply because other things have to happen first.
The *current* situation makes this bug report unfixable and would make it a WONTFIX, but that doesn't mean that in the long run the situation might not improve.

Recommended reading:

Peter Wayner "Disappearing Cryptography" Third edition pages 225-227, 2009.
ISBN 978-0-12-374479-1

Pages 225-227 Chapter 10.7.3 "Stopping Bad user":

"bad users of the onion routing network can ruin the reputation of other users. The Wikipedia, for instance, often blocks TOR exit nodes complete because some people have used the network to hide their identities while defacing the wiki's entries..."

In the further passages Peter Wayner explains a "one straight-forward solution is to use some form of certificates with a blind signature, a technique that borrows from some of the early solutions for building anonymous digital cash" (A typical example with "Alice" follows - must read this).

(In reply to comment #17)

(In reply to comment #16)

So because nobody is willing to fix this, I think it is a typical WONTFIX. (I
reported this issue, I set it now to WONTFIX, and feel unhappy for Jake)

Actually there are people willing to work toward a technical solution that
consists neither of removing Torblock altogether nor of the status quo. See
e.g. the comment in the current Wikitech-l thread by Chris Steipp [...]

Sure, but there is no clarity on whether actually there is a problem, not to speak of consensus on a general lifting of the TorBlock. Absent new information/big changes in general sentiment of the Wikimedia projects, this bug should be considered closed.

Speaking of Chris, he asked a question: "Or is there still a step that is missing?" http://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikitech-l/2014-January/073949.html

"WORKSFORME" is the wrong status for closing. As I wrote in the title and as reported by me, at least some persons request to be able to edit wikipedia article via TOR.

As mentioned in the book cited above

Peter Wayner "Disappearing Cryptography" Third edition pages 225-227, 2009.
ISBN 978-0-12-374479-1

Pages 225-227 Chapter 10.7.3 "Stopping Bad user":

"bad users of the onion routing network can ruin the reputation of other users.
The Wikipedia, for instance, often blocks TOR exit nodes complete because some
people have used the network to hide their identities while defacing the wiki's
entries..."

In the further passages Peter Wayner explains a "one straight-forward solution
is to use some form of certificates with a blind signature, a technique that
borrows from some of the early solutions for building anonymous digital cash"
(A typical example with "Alice" follows - must read this).

there exist solutions.

As long as this is not solved, the request at least is valid. If you do not want to fix it now, it is WONTFIX, and not WORKSFORME.

Thanks for the duplicate comment, I had read it already. More useful would be if you gave an answer to the question above.

Nemo, why do you set this to WORKSFORME ? You blame all the people using TOR and who CANNOT edit Wikipedia, so WORKFORME is simply the wrong flag.

Sorry, I didn't mean to change status.

Nemo, I cannot answer the technical, or political question/s. I am only the _messenger_ (see original posting in the mailinglist) and wanted to (re)start a fruitful discussion, with the goal, that edits-via-TOR will become possible.

At least, the discussion has reached a broader audience, and some idea came up.

These should be collected on a suited MediaWiki page, may be in addition to https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/NOP .

I didn't ask any technical or political question. I asked if there is a single person who tried to get access via TOR and was denied it. Absent a single individual example, this issue DOES NOT EXIST.

Can someone please post a *short* text (how to) which I can forward to persons who want to edit Wikipedia article via TOR à la

"How to edit Wikipedia articles via TOR"

(In reply to comment #27)

Can someone please post a *short* text (how to) which I can forward to
persons
who want to edit Wikipedia article via TOR à la

"How to edit Wikipedia articles via TOR"

I haven't done this personally, so if there's something missing someone else can jump in, but in general it should be:

• Using your method of choice, email stewards@wikimedia.org requesting they create you an account for use over tor. Include your desired username, and why you need to use tor.
• A steward will create and account for you, and email the username and temporary password back
• You can now login and edit while using tor

Literature (implementation idea):

http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2009.38

Tsang, P.P.; Kapadia, A.; Cornelius, C.; Smith, S.W.,
"Nymble: Blocking Misbehaving Users in Anonymizing Networks."
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol.8, no.2, pp.256-269, March-April 2011.

(In reply to comment #27)

Can someone please post a *short* text (how to) which I can forward to
persons
who want to edit Wikipedia article via TOR à la

"How to edit Wikipedia articles via TOR"

[[m:NOP]], linked a gazillion times already.