Author: Abigor
Description:
Hello,
Since the closure of the tor network there is a bug in the admin usergroup rights. When A admin edit's with a tor ip the need to give themselves ip-block-exept first otherwise the are blocked.
Please edit the groupright so admins are not longer blocked by tor. Its kind of stupid when a admin needs to give them selves rights to be able to edit.
Version: unspecified
Severity: enhancement
This happens at Wikimedia Commons. According to http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:ListGroupRights users in the group Administrators have the "ipblock-exempt" right, but not the "torunblocked" right. So to get around a tor block admins have to add themselves to IP block exemptions group. This could be fixed by adding torunblocked right to the admins group, unless of course this behaviour is intentional.
Abigor wrote:
Please don't say it is only on Commons, I checked it on Incubator, Simple.wikibooks and nl.wikipedia so it is global..
Isn't it stupid and a waste of time to make a vote about the fact that Admins can edit with the tor network by default? Any administrator can give themself that right so why don't activate it by default?
Sorry, where did I say this only on Commons? Commons is one of the wiki's where I observed this behaviour ( http://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ALog&type=rights&user=&page=user%3ADcoetzee&year=&month=-1&tagfilter= ). It's always good to give an example in a bug report so that people can verify it.
It should be rather easy to get consensus to change this at Commons (example!!), but maybe changing the default behaviour is better.
(In reply to comment #3)
Isn't it stupid and a waste of time to make a vote about the fact that Admins
can edit with the tor network by default? Any administrator can give themself
that right so why don't activate it by default?
I'm not asking for a vote. It just makes sense to see what others think of the idea before immediately implementing a change.
Those administrators who need to use tor for one reason or another can add themselves to the group, as you rightly point out, so there is no high-priority issue, and therefore we have time to discuss the best implementation. It may make sense to require this for the purpose of greater transparency.
For transparency reasons, I prefer that admins need to make the change in order to use Tor. I believe this is s/w of a deterrent for abusive use of Tor for admin socking.
Sydney
+shellpolicy, Although doesn't need consensus apparently per andrew's comment, Still needs wider discussion.
EN.WP.ST47 wrote:
Does anyone involved in this want to advise us on whether this was completed, is still needed, or is withdrawn?
Can someone clarify when/why this was closed as declined/wontfix? I can't see that in the activity logs of this task -- perhaps it's a detail that wasn't preserved in the bugzilla import.
Thanks. For future reference, the status changes can be seen in https://static-bugzilla.wikimedia.org/show_activity.cgi?id=18640. As for the current task status, I suppose the best mapping to RESOLVED LATER in Phabricator would be "Stalled", no?