Citations of:
Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles
Erkenntnis 85 (4):957993 (2020)
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This paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support (...) 

This paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support (...) 

In this paper we dispel the supposed ``admissibility troubles'' for Bayesian accounts of direct inference proposed by Wallmann and Hawthorne, which concern the existence of surprising, unintuitive defeaters even for mundane cases of direct inference. We show that if one follows the majority of authors in the field in using classical probability spaces unimbued with any additional structure, one should expect similar phenomena to arise and should consider them unproblematic in themselves: defeaters abound! We then show that the framework of (...) 