Goal
We want to look into the SecurePoll extension to assess its current state.
We want to look into the SecurePoll extension to assess its current state.
Status | Subtype | Assigned | Task | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Open | None | T270291 Secure Poll | |||
Resolved | Tchanders | T266695 Investigate SecurePoll [8Hr] |
Finally! :)
In all seriousness, I am very excited about this. I have been thinking/wishing that we could do an overhaul and modernization of this extension in the same fashion done for CheckUser (as in, create a parallel set of special pages, etc.)
I am sure you have seen T145653 and its related tasks.
I am the de facto maintainer of SecurePoll so I am happy to assist in any way I can.
Thanks a lot @Huji! It's awesome to know that you have experience working with SecurePoll. We have been asked to look into this extension to see how much work might go into improving it and to decide if we want to adapt something that has been built externally and does the job better.
In that case, perhaps I can help you with listing a set of acceptance criteria for the next tool (may it be a revamp of SecurePoll, or an external tool that people can log into using OAuth or something). For now, I refer to that as "future tool".
Here are a set of features that the future tool should support (most of which are currently supported by the existing version of SecurePoll):
Here are a set of additional enhancements that would desirable; by definition, none of them is currently supported:
Further to @Huji's helpful comment just above, here's a summary of some more of SecurePoll's features.
Users with the securepoll-create-poll right can:
Poll admins can:
i18n support:
a11y support:
Voter eligibility can be determined by:
Features of polls:
SecurePoll has some privacy problems (some of which are mentioned in T152972). These include:
My impression is that SecurePoll meets most of Trust-and-Safety's requirements for polling software, except regarding the privacy problems. If we were to do a revamp of SecurePoll in time for next year's board elections, I think we could meet the minimum requirements by addressing these privacy issues.
I believe @Niharika is looking into using external tools? I could see that route taking more work: e.g. finding a tool that satisfies the requirements, potentially agreeing contracts; hosting the tool (or getting community agreement to use an externally-hosted tool); adding comprehensive i18n support (e.g. integrating with translatewiki, implementing something like SecurePoll's translation UI); determining voter eligibility (we may have to query CentralAuth for user account info). We may also find that it takes a similar amount of work to ensure access to private information is controlled and logged appropriately as with SecurePoll.
Great summary, @Tchanders . I just wanted to add that T268794 should also be in scope for this investigation.
As a scrutineer for this year's enwiki ArbCom elections, I'd like to suggest some improvements:
I also disagree with @Huji's closure of the private data, as that will prevent the detection of possible socking which will most likely (IMO) result in a rubberstamp check of every vote. I don't disagree, however, on the possibility of the creation of a new right (something like securepoll-view-private) that would allow users to view that.
As for the NDA requirement, that is normally covered: enwiki requires election commissioners to have signed the NDA (don't know if that's the case for fawiki, but Huji was the responsible for this year's election and, as a CU, has signed it too), scrutineers for fawiki and enwiki arbcom elections are always stewards, who have already signed it, and the electadmins that set up the polls are WMF staffers, who are covered by NDAs already.