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Mailman3 XSS via username on hyperkitty tags API (CVE-2018-25045)
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Description

The security auditors provided us with a critical issue, that a user with malicious HTML in their username can use the tags API to create a tag with any name, and then when you visit the /hyperkitty/api/tags/ endpoint, you get an XSS.

I didn't get around to reproducing or tracing this yet, but I did look at all the tags on lists.wikimedia.org and they're all nonsense/junk/spam. My suggestion would be to get an apache2 rule in place to block the "create tag" API which hopefully neuters this bug and stops people from adding nonsense. And then with less urgency, we can figure out how to fix the underlying issue, possibly with upstream if it's still vulnerable in master.

Details

Event Timeline

Legoktm triaged this task as Unbreak Now! priority.Jul 7 2022, 6:34 AM

I think disabling /api/tags/ won't be enough. The xss in subject line still exists.

I think disabling /api/tags/ won't be enough. The xss in subject line still exists.

Right, to be clear this would just fix the tags XSS. I didn't get around to looking at the subject line one last night.

diff --git a/modules/profile/templates/lists/apache.conf.erb b/modules/profile/templates/lists/apache.conf.erb
index c9ed2b0b32..5587699cde 100644
--- a/modules/profile/templates/lists/apache.conf.erb
+++ b/modules/profile/templates/lists/apache.conf.erb
@@ -30,6 +30,14 @@
     <% end %>
     <%= @ssl_settings.join("\n    ") %>
 
+    # Reject the creation of tags, which are an XSS vector when combined with a
+    # a users' name field and the tags url,
+    # https://polymorphic.lists.wmcloud.org/hyperkitty/api/tags/
+    # https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T312506
+    RewriteEngine on
+    RewriteCond %{REQUEST_METHOD} POST
+    RewriteRule ^/hyperkitty/list/.*/tags$ - [F]
+
     Header set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'"
     Alias /mailman3/favicon.ico /var/lib/mailman3/web/static/postorius/img/favicon.ico
     Alias /mailman3/static      /var/lib/mailman3/web/static

This rejects the creation of tags in my testing on https://polymorphic.lists.wmcloud.org/

Would something like:

RewriteCond %{REQUEST_METHOD} GET
RewriteRule ^/hyperkitty/api/list/.*/thread/.*/$ - [F]

work for the second issue with script code in email subjects? Or would that have some unintended affects? It seems to work on my initial testing.

On IRC @jhathaway asked about how to publish it. It needs to go through puppet, but for the tags one I can say we're just getting rid of spam instead of discussing the XSS. Like, look at all the tags on this random wikitech-l post:

Screenshot 2022-07-08 at 12-34-16 Examples of projects using NLP - Wikitech-l - lists.wikimedia.org.png (1×2 px, 289 KB)

On Wednesday I had gone through and literally all the hundreds of tags were nonsense spam except 2.

Note that I haven't had a chance to look through the email subject issue yet.

Both of the above mitigations are now in place. I believe we are no longer susceptible to either compromise. @Legoktm did you happen to hear back from the upstream developer?

Upstream message:

I have tested the critical vulnerability on an installation with djangorestframework==3.13.1 and am unable to duplicate the issue. This may have been fixed in djangorestframework 3.11.2 or 3.9.1, see https://www.django-rest-framework.org/community/release-notes/.
In any case, my results for POCs 1 and 2 are attached. In neither case was an alert raised. Further, POC 3 depends on POC 1 or 2, so that is presumably not an issue with djangorestframework==3.13.1.
I have not yet tested any of the other issues

Looks like this was the fix, https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/commit/4bb9a3c48427867ef1e46f7dee945a4c25a4f9b8. This fix is included in the bullseye version of python3-djangorestframework. So we should upgrade the box to bullseye and remove mitigations.

Looks like this was the fix, https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/commit/4bb9a3c48427867ef1e46f7dee945a4c25a4f9b8. This fix is included in the bullseye version of python3-djangorestframework. So we should upgrade the box to bullseye and remove mitigations.

This will also affect other mailman 3 installations on Buster, so let's rather backport the fix to 3.9.0-1? there's also a second low-prio issue we can fix along: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-25626
This can be fixed via buster-security, which will then end up in our infra by updating from Debian.

We can/should still update to Bullseye, but that can be disentangled from the current security issue.

We should also get a CVE assigned to https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/commit/4bb9a3c48427867ef1e46f7dee945a4c25a4f9b8 (since there was none, it wasn't picked up by any distro or security triage process), I'll take care of that.

@MoritzMuehlenhoff I did a little more digging and it looks like you are correct, there are two inter-related XSS issues in 3.9.0:

  1. urlize_quoted_links, XSS vector, https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/pull/6330, fix https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/commit/4bb9a3c48427867ef1e46f7dee945a4c25a4f9b8, fix appears in 3.9.2
  2. urlize_quoted_links, still an XSS vector, replace with urlize from django, https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-25626, fix: https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/commit/4121b01b912668c049b26194a9a107c27a332429, fix appears in 3.11.2

So I think we need to backport both patches together, the second patch never made it into the 3.9.X series.

So I think we need to backport both patches together, the second patch never made it into the 3.9.X series.

I've backported both patches to 3.9.0 and copied 3.9.0-1+deb10u1 to lists1001.wikimedia.org:/home/jmm. Do you have access to the test setup for the pen test, could you verify this update fixes the issue found by the auditors? Then I'd release these via security.debian.org as a followup step.

great, I do have access to the pen testing environment, so I will test today and report back.

Excellent, thanks. A DSA should be out tomorrow, then we can update lists1001.

@MoritzMuehlenhoff @jhathaway - Looks like enough has been publicly-disclosed about this issue now to where we could make this task public? Or are we still waiting on anything in particular that would block on that?

The update in Debian has been released: https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2022/msg00154.html

The CVE assignment is still pending, haven't heard since then.

@sbassett Im fine with opening the task.

sbassett changed Author Affiliation from N/A to Wikimedia Communities.Jul 22 2022, 2:22 PM
sbassett changed the visibility from "Custom Policy" to "Public (No Login Required)".
sbassett changed the edit policy from "Custom Policy" to "All Users".
sbassett changed Risk Rating from N/A to High.
sbassett moved this task from Watching to Our Part Is Done on the Security-Team board.

This has been assigned CVE-2018-25045

MoritzMuehlenhoff renamed this task from Mailman3 XSS via username on hyperkitty tags API to Mailman3 XSS via username on hyperkitty tags API (CVE-2018-25045).Jul 23 2022, 6:01 PM
jhathaway closed subtask Restricted Task as Resolved.Oct 15 2024, 3:59 PM